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Abstract—In this paper, we study resource allocation design
for secure communication in intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)-
assisted multiuser multiple-input single-output (MISO) communi-
cation systems. To enhance physical layer security, artificial noise
(AN) is transmitted from the base station (BS) to deliberately
impair the channel of an eavesdropper. In particular, we jointly
optimize the phase shift matrix at the IRS and the beamforming
vectors and AN covariance matrix at the BS for maximization
of the system sum secrecy rate. To handle the resulting non-
convex optimization problem, we develop an efficient suboptimal
algorithm based on alternating optimization, successive convex
approximation, semidefinite relaxation, and manifold optimization.
Our simulation results reveal that the proposed scheme substan-
tially improves the system sum secrecy rate compared to two
baseline schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)-assisted wireless
communication systems have received considerable attention as
a promising approach for providing cost-effective and power-
efficient high data-rate communication services for the fifth-
generation and beyond wireless communication systems [1]–
[6]. Consisting of a set of small reflecting elements, IRSs can
be easily and flexibly deployed on building facades and interior
walls, improving communication service coverage [1]. Com-
pared to conventional relays and distributed antenna systems [7],
passive reflectors embedded in IRSs require little operational
power which makes them suitable for deployment in energy-
constrained systems. Furthermore, due to their programmability
and reconfigurability, IRSs can be adjusted on-demand such
that a favourable radio propagation environment is obtained
to improve system performance [1]. As a result, several initial
works have addressed technical issues regarding the design of
IRS-assisted communication systems. For instance, the authors
in [3] investigated the joint transmit beamforming and phase
shift matrix design for maximization of the total received power
of the user of an IRS-enhanced single-user system. In [5], two
computationally efficient suboptimal algorithms were developed
for maximization of the spectral efficiency achieved by an IRS-
assisted multiple-input single-output (MISO) communication
system. However, these works did not consider security and
the obtained results may not be applicable to systems where
communication security is a concern.
Recently, physical layer security has emerged as a promising
technology to facilitate secure communication in wireless sys-
tems [8]. By configuring multiple antennas at the base station
(BS), beamforming can be employed to degrade the channel
quality of eavesdroppers. In [9], a transmit beamforming al-
gorithm was designed to achieve communication secrecy in
a MISO wireless system. Furthermore, the authors of [10]
proposed two algorithms to maximize the secrecy rate in an
IRS-assisted MISO wireless system. In [11], the authors jointly
optimized the beamforming vectors at the BS and the phase
shifts at the IRS for maximization of the secrecy rate of
a legitimate user. In [12], an alternating optimization-based
algorithm was developed to achieve secure communication for
an IRS-aided MISO system with a single user. However, in
[10]–[12], artificial noise (AN) is not employed for security
enhancement. Nevertheless, AN transmission is an effective
approach to improve physical layer security [13]. Moreover,
[10]–[12] focused on the case of maximizing the secrecy rate
of a single user and the proposed schemes may not be able
to guarantee secure communication for multiuser IRS-assisted
systems. The authors of [14] investigated the resource allocation
algorithm design for maximization of the minimum secrecy rate
among several legitimate users of an IRS-assisted multiuser
MISO system. However, in [14] the unit modulus constraint
introduced by the reflectors of the IRS was approximated by
a convex constraint, which simplifies the optimization problem
considerably and may lead to a performance loss. Therefore,
the design of efficient resource allocation algorithms for max-
imization of the sum secrecy rate of IRS-assisted multiuser
communication systems employing AN to impair eavesdroppers
and imposing a unit modulus constraint for the IRS reflectors
remains an open issue.
Motivated by the above discussions, in this paper, we inves-
tigate the joint design of the phase shift matrix at the IRS and
the downlink (DL) beamforming vectors and the AN covariance
matrix at the BS for maximizing the system sum secrecy rate.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, after introducing the notations used in this
paper, we present the system model adopted for IRS-assisted
communication.
A. Notations
In this paper, we use boldface capital and lower case letters to
represent matrices and vectors, respectively. RN×M and CN×M
denote the space of N × M real-valued and complex-valued
matrices, respectively. HN denotes the set of all N -dimensional
complex Hermitian matrices. IN indicates an N × N identity
matrix. | · | and || · ||2 denote the absolute value of a complex
scalar and the l2-norm of a vector, respectively. x
T , and xH
stand for the transpose and the conjugate transpose of vector x,
respectively. A  0 indicates that A is a positive semidefinite
matrix. Rank(A), Tr(A), and [A]i,i denote the rank, the trace,
and the (i, i)-entry of matrixA, respectively. xi denotes the i-th
element of vector x. diag(x) represents the N × N diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements x1, · · · , xN . unt(x) represents
an N -dimensional vector with elements x1|x1| , · · · ,
xN
|xN |
. A ◦B
represents the Hadamard product of matrices A and B. ℜ{·}
extracts the real value of a complex variable. E {·} denotes
statistical expectation.
∆
= and ∼ stand for “defined as” and
“distributed as”, respectively. The distribution of a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with mean µ
and variance σ2 is denoted by CN (µ, σ2). [x]+ stands for
max {0, x}. The gradient vector of function f(x) with respect
to x is denoted by ∇xf(x).
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Fig. 1. An intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)-assisted secure communication
system with one eavesdropper and K = 3 desired users. The direct links from
the BS to the users and the eavesdropper are blocked by a building.
B. IRS-assisted Multiuser Wireless Communication System
We consider an IRS-assisted multiuser DL communication
system which comprises a BS, an eavesdropper, an IRS, and a
set of desired users, indexed by K
∆
= {1, · · · ,K}, as illustrated
in Figure 1. The BS is equipped with NT > 1 antennas,
while both the desired users and the eavesdropper are single-
antenna devices. Moreover, a passive IRS is deployed to achieve
secure communication between the BS and the users. The IRS
employs M phase shifters, indexed by M
∆
= {1, · · · ,M},
and can be programmed and reconfigured via a controller.
Furthermore, perfect channel state information (CSI) of the
whole system is assumed to be available at the BS for resource
allocation design1. Besides, we assume that the direct links
from the BS to the users and the eavesdropper are unavailable
due to unfavorable propagation conditions (e.g., blockage by a
building).
In each scheduling time slot, the BS transmits a signal vector
x ∈ CNT to the K users. In particular, the signal vector, which
comprises K information signals and AN, is given by
x =
∑
k∈K
wksk + z, (1)
where wk ∈ CNT and sk ∈ C denote the beamforming vector
for the k-th user and the corresponding information bearing
signal, respectively. We assume E{|sk|
2} = 1, ∀k ∈ K, without
loss of generality. Moreover, to guarantee secure communica-
tion, an AN vector z ∈ CNT is generated and transmitted by
the BS to impair the eavesdropper. In particular, we model
z as a complex Gaussian random vector with zero mean and
covariance matrix Z ∈ HNT , Z  0.
The signals received by user k and the eavesdropper via the
reflection at the IRS are given by
yk = g
H
k ΦH(
∑
k∈K
wksk + z) + nk, (2)
ye = l
HΦH(
∑
k∈K
wksk + z) + ne, (3)
respectively, where gk ∈ CM and l ∈ CM denote the channel
vectors between the IRS and user k and between the IRS
and the eavesdropper, respectively. Φ = diag
(
ejφ1 , · · · , ejφM
)
denotes the phase shift matrix of the IRS, where φm, ∀m ∈ M,
represents the phase shift of the m-th reflector of the IRS
[3]. The channel matrix between the BS and the IRS is
denoted by H ∈ CM×NT . Besides, nk ∼ CN (0, σ2nk) and
ne ∼ CN (0, σ2ne) are the additive white Gaussian noise samples
at user k and the eavesdropper, respectively.
1In practice, the BS may not be able to obtain perfect CSI. Hence, the results
in this paper serve as a theoretical system performance benchmark.
III. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first define the adopted system per-
formance metric and then formulate the resource allocation
optimization problem for the considered system.
A. Achievable Rate and Secrecy Rate
The achievable rate (bits/s/Hz) of user k is given by Rk =
log2(1 + Γk), where
Γk=
∣∣gHk ΦHwk∣∣2∑
r∈K\{k}
∣∣gHk ΦHwr∣∣2+Tr(HHΦHgkgHk ΦHZ)+σ2nk
. (4)
In this paper, we impose a worst-case assumption regarding the
capabilities of the eavesdropper for resource allocation algo-
rithm design to ensure secure communication [13]. Specifically,
we assume that the eavesdropper is capable of canceling all
multiuser interference before decoding the desired information.
Therefore, the channel capacity between the BS and the eaves-
dropper for wiretapping user k is given by
CEk = log2
(
1 +
∣∣lHΦHwk∣∣2
Tr(HHΦH llHΦHZ) + σ2ne
)
. (5)
The achievable secrecy rate between the BS and user k is given
by RSeck =
[
Rk − CEk
]+
[15].
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
We aim to maximize the system sum secrecy rate by opti-
mizing wk, Z, and Φ. The corresponding optimization problem
is formulated as
maximize
wk ,Z∈HNT ,Φ
∑
k∈K
[
Rk − C
E
k
]+
(6)
s.t. C1:
∑
k∈K
‖wk‖
2 +Tr(Z) ≤ Pmax,
C2:
∣∣∣[Φ]m,m
∣∣∣ = 1, ∀m, C3: Z  0.
Constraint C1 limits the maximum BS transmit power allowance
to Pmax. Besides, the operator [·]
+
has no impact on the optimal
solution and hence is omitted in the following for notational
simplicity2.
We note that it is very arduous to obtain the globally optimal
solution of (6), due to the coupling of the optimization variables
and the unit modulus constraint in C2. Therefore, we develop a
resource allocation algorithm based on alternating optimization
[16] to obtain a suboptimal solution of (6) in the next section.
IV. SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
In this section, we aim to design a computationally ef-
ficient suboptimal algorithm for handling (6) via alternating
optimization. For notational simplicity, we first define Gk =
diag(gHk )H, L = diag(l
H)H, Wk = wkw
H
k . Moreover, we
define a new optimization variable u =
[
ejφ1 , · · · , ejφM
]T
.
Then, we rewrite the received SINRs at user k as follows:
Γk=
Tr(WkG
H
k uu
HGk)∑
r∈K\{k}
Tr(WrGHk uu
HGk)+Tr(ZGHk uu
HGk)+σ2nk
. (7)
2It can be proved that at the optimal solution, if the achievable secrecy rate of
user k is non-positive, the proposed algorithm would turn off the transmission
of user k and reallocate the available power to other users.
Moreover, the channel capacity for the eavesdropper with re-
spect to the message of user k in (5) can be rewritten as
CEk = log2
(
1 +
Tr(WkL
HuuHL)
Tr(ZLHuuHL) + σ2ne
)
. (8)
Now, to facilitate the application of alternating optimization, we
first recast (6) in equivalent form as follows:
minimize
Z∈HNT ,W,u
f = F1 + F2 −G1 −G2 (9)
s.t. C1:
∑
k∈K
Tr(Wk) + Tr(Z) ≤ Pmax,
C2: |um| = 1, ∀m, C3: Z  0,
C4: Wk  0, ∀k, C5: Rank(Wk) ≤ 1, ∀k,
where W ∈ CK×NT are the collection of all Wk, and F1, F2,
G1, and G2 are shown at the bottom of this page. Moreover,
um is the m-th element of u, and Wk ∈ HNT , Wk  0,
and Rank(Wk) ≤ 1 in (9) are imposed to ensure that Wk =
wkw
H
k holds after optimization.
By employing alternating optimization, we iteratively opti-
mize {W,Z} and u with the other one fixed. In particular,
for a given u, we solve (9) by employing successive convex
approximation (SCA) [17] and semidefinite relaxation (SDR)
[15]. Then, for given W and Z, we solve for u by applying
manifold optimization [18].
A. SCA and SDR
For a given u, the optimization problem in (9) can be
rewritten as minimize
Z∈HNT ,W
F1 + F2 −G1 −G2 (12)
s.t. C1,C3-C5.
To facilitate the application of SCA, we first construct global
underestimators of G1 and G2, respectively [17]. In particular,
for any feasible point Wi and Zi, the differentiable convex
function G1(W,Z) satisfies the following inequality:
G1(W,Z) ≥ G1(W
i,Zi)
+Tr
((
∇WG1(W
i,Zi)
)T
(W −Wi)
)
+Tr
((
∇ZG1(W
i,Zi)
)T
(Z− Zi)
)
∆
= G˜1(W,Z,W
i,Zi), (13)
where the right hand side term in (13) is a global underes-
timation of G1(W,Z). Similarly, a global underestimation of
G2(W,Z) at feasible point W
i and Zi can be constructed as
follows
G˜2(W,Z,W
i,Zi)
∆
= G2(W
i,Zi)
+Tr
((
∇WG2(W
i,Zi)
)T
(W −Wi)
)
+Tr
((
∇ZG2(W
i,Zi)
)T
(Z− Zi)
)
. (14)
Therefore, for any given Wi and Zi, an upper bound of (12)
can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
Z∈HNT ,W
F1 + F2 − G˜1 − G˜2 (15)
s.t. C1,C3-C5.
Algorithm 1 Successive Convex Approximation-Based Algo-
rithm
1: Initialize iteration index i = 1.
2: repeat
3: Solve (15) for given Wi and Zi and store the intermediate
solution W,Z
4: Set i = i+ 1 and Wi =W and Zi = Z
5: until convergence
6: W
∗ =Wi and Z∗ = Zi
We note that the remaining non-convexity of (15) stems from
the rank-one constraint C5. To tackle this issue, we remove
constraint C5 by applying SDR where the relaxed version of
(15) can be efficiently solved via convex problem solvers such
as CVX [19]. In the following theorem, we reveal the tightness
of SDR.
Theorem 1: If Pmax > 0, an optimal beamforming matrix
Wk satisfying Rank(Wk) ≤ 1 can always be obtained.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix. 
We note that the minimum of (15) serves as an upper bound
of (12). By employing the algorithm summarized in Algorithm
1, we can iteratively tighten the upper bound and obtain a
sequence of solutions W and Z. It can be shown that the
objective function in (15) is non-increasing in each iteration, and
the developed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a locally
optimal solution of (12) [17].
B. Oblique Manifold Optimization
For given Wk and Z, we can rewrite (9) as:
minimize
u
F1 + F2 −G1 −G2 (16)
s.t. C2: [uuH ]m,m = 1, ∀m.
We note that it is very challenging to solve (16) optimally
due to the non-convex unit modulus constraint C2. In the
literature, the unit modulus constraint is often handled by SDR
and Gaussian randomization [3] which leads to a suboptimal
solution. Yet, the objective function may not be monotoni-
cally non-increasing in each iteration when this approach is
applied. Thus, the corresponding algorithm cannot guarantee
convergence. In contrast, in this paper, we develop a manifold
optimization-based algorithm which is guaranteed to converge
to a suboptimal solution. Moreover, unlike [14] where the
unit modulus constraint was relaxed, in this paper, the unit
modulus constraint is handled directly by exploiting manifold
optimization theory [18]. We note that constraint C2 defines an
oblique manifold [18] which can be characterized by
O =
{
u ∈ CM | [uuH ]m,m = 1, ∀m ∈ M
}
. (17)
We note that constraint C2 is automatically satisfied when
optimizing u over the oblique manifold. Now, we introduce
some definitions which are commonly used in Riemannian
manifold optimization [18].
The tangent space of the oblique manifold O at point uj is
defined as the space which contains all tangent vectors of the
F1=−
∑
k∈K
log2
(∑
r∈K
Tr(WrG
H
k uu
HGk)+Tr(ZG
H
k uu
HGk)+σ
2
nk
)
, F2 =−Klog2
(
Tr(ZLHuuHL) + σ2ne
)
, (10)
G1=−
∑
k∈K
log2
(∑
r∈K\{k}
Tr(WrG
H
k uu
HGk)+Tr(ZG
H
k uu
HGk)+σ
2
nk
)
, G2=−
∑
k∈K
log2
(
Tr(WkL
HuuHL)+Tr(ZLHuuHL)+σ2ne
)
(11)
uj
O
TujO grad
uj
f
∇ujf
(a) Tangent space and Riemannian gradient.
uj
uj+1
O
TujO
Tuj+1O
µk
Tuj→uj+1
(
µj
)
(b) Vector transport.
uj
uj+1
Ruj(δjµj)
O
TujO µj δjµj
(c) Retraction.
Fig. 2. An illustration of major definitions in Riemannian manifold optimization.
oblique manifold O at point uj , cf. Figure 2(a). Specifically,
each tangent vector is a vector that is a tangent to the oblique
manifold O at point uj [18]. The tangent space for O at uj is
given by
TujO =
{
v ∈ CM | [vuHj ]m,m = 0, ∀m ∈M
}
, (18)
where v is a tangent vector at uj . Among all tangent vectors,
the one that yields the fastest increase of the objective function
is defined as the Riemannian gradient, i.e., grad
uj
f . The
Riemannian gradient of function f at point uj is calculated
based on the orthogonal projection of the Euclidean gradient
∇ujf onto tangent space TujO [20]. In particular, gradujf is
given by
gradujf = ∇ujf −ℜ
{
∇ujf ◦ (u
T
j )
H
}
◦ uj , (19)
where ∇ujf is obtained as [21]
∇ujf =
KL(ZH + Z)LHuj
(ln2)F2(uj)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
r∈K
[
Gk(W
H
r +Wr + Z
H + Z)GHk uj
]
(ln2)F1(uj)
−
∑
k∈K
∑
r∈K\{k}
[
Gk(W
H
r +Wr + Z
H + Z)GHk uj
]
(ln2)G1(uj)
−
∑
k∈K
L(WHk +Wk + Z
H + Z)LHuj
(ln2)G2(uj)
. (20)
After obtaining the Riemannian gradient gradujf , we can
exploit the optimization approaches designed for the Euclidean
space to tackle manifold optimization problems. In particular,
we employ the conjugate gradient (CG) method [22], where
the update rule of the search direction in the Euclidean space
is given by
µj+1 = −∇uj+1f + αjµj . (21)
Here, µj denotes the search direction at uj and αj is chosen
as the Polak-Ribie`re parameter to achieve fast convergence
[22]. However, since vectors µj and µj+1 in (21) lie in TujO
and Tuj+1O, respectively, they cannot be integrated directly
over different tangent spaces. To circumvent this problem, we
introduce an operation called transport which maps µj from
tangent space TujO to tangent space Tuj+1O [23]. In particular,
the vector transport for oblique manifold O, as shown in cf.
Figure 2(b), is given by
Tuj→uj+1(µj)
∆
= TujO 7→ Tuj+1O :
µj 7→ µj−ℜ
{
µj ◦(u
T
j+1)
H
}
◦uj+1.(22)
Algorithm 2 Oblique Manifold Optimization-Based Algorithm
1: Set iteration index j = 1, convergence tolerance ε, step size δj ,
and initial point u1
2: Calculate the Riemannian gradient according to (19)
3: repeat
4: Choose the step size δj according to [18, p. 62]
5: Find uj+1 by retraction in (24)
6: Update Riemannian gradient grad
uj+1
f by using (19)
7: Calculate the vector transport Tuj→uj+1(µj) by using (22)
8: Choose Polak-Ribie`re parameter αj according to [18, Eq. 8.24]
9: Calculate conjugate search direction µj+1 by using (23)
10: Set j = j + 1
11: until
∥
∥
∥grad
uj
f
∥
∥
∥ ≤ ε
12: Set Φ = diag
(
(uTj+1)
H
)
Algorithm 3 Alternating Optimization Algorithm
1: Set iteration index t = 1, the initial point u(1), convergence
tolerance ǫ, maximum iteration number Tmax.
2: repeat
3: Solve (12) via Algorithm 1 for given u(t) and store the optimal
solution W(t) and Z(t)
4: Solve (16) via Algorithm 2 for givenW(t) and Z(t) and store
the solution u(t+1)
5: Set t = t+ 1
6: until
∣
∣
∣f (t+1) − f (t)
∣
∣
∣ ≤ ǫ
7: Obtain the solution by W∗ =W(t), Z∗ = Z(t), and u∗ = u(t)
Similar to (21), the search direction of the Riemannian gradient
in (19) can be updated based on the following equation:
µj+1 = −graduj+1f + αjTuj→uj+1(µj). (23)
After determining the search direction µj at uj , we introduce
another operation called retraction to determine the destination
on the oblique manifold [23]. In other words, by applying
retraction, we map a vector in the tangent space TujO onto
the manifold O, cf. Figure 2(c). In particular, for a given point
uj on manifold O, the retraction for step size δj and search
direction µj are given as
Ruj (δjµj)
∆
= TujO 7→ O : δjµj 7→ unt(δjµj). (24)
The problem in (16) can be tackled by applying the proposed
algorithm summarized in Algorithm 2. Since Algorithm 2 is a
gradient-based algorithm, the objective function in (16) is mono-
tonically non-increasing in each iteration. Hence, Algorithm 2
is guaranteed to converge to a stationary point of (16) [22].
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
System bandwidth and carrier center frequency 200 kHz and 2.4 GHz
Noise powers, σ2nk and σ
2
ne
−110 dBm
BS maximum transmit power, Pmax 40 dBm
Convergence tolerances, ǫ and ε 10−3
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Fig. 3. Average system sum secrecy rate (bits/s/Hz) versus maximum transmit
power (dBm) with K = 3, NT = 6, and M = 6.
The proposed alternating optimization algorithm is sum-
marized in Algorithm 3. Recall that the objective function
is monotonically non-increasing after each iteration of both
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Therefore, the proposed al-
ternating optimization algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a
suboptimal solution of (9).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We investigate the system performance of the proposed
resource allocation scheme via simulations. Table I summarizes
the parameters used in our simulation. In particular, the BS is
at the center of a single cell with radius 500 meters. One sector
of the cell happens to be blocked by buildings and there are
K users randomly and uniformly distributed within this sector.
An IRS is deployed to provide communication service for the
users in this sector. We focus on the resource allocation design
to achieve secure communication in this sector. Moreover, we
also adopt two baseline schemes for comparison. For baseline
scheme 1, we adopt an IRS with random phase φm, ∀m ∈ M
[1], and jointly optimize wk and Z. For baseline scheme 2,
the BS does not generate AN (as in [10]–[12]) and an IRS
is employed for security provisioning. In this case, we jointly
optimize only wk and Φ to achieve secure communication. rBe
and rRe denote the distance from the BS to the eavesdropper
and the distance from the IRS to the eavesdropper, respectively.
In Figure 3, we study the average system sum secrecy
rate versus the maximum transmit power. As expected, the
system sum secrecy rates for the proposed scheme and the two
baseline schemes increase monotonically with increasing Pmax.
Moreover, we can see that the proposed scheme outperforms
the baseline schemes. In fact, by jointly optimizing Φ, wk, and
Z, the proposed scheme can simultaneously facilitates a more
favourable radio propagation environment for the users and
impair the eavesdropper. In contrast, the two baseline schemes
achieve significantly lower system sum secrecy rates, due to the
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Fig. 4. Average system sum secrecy secrecy rate (bits/s/Hz) versus number of
users with Pmax = 20 dBm, rBe = 200 m, and rRe = 250 m.
random phase of the IRS for baseline scheme 1 and the lack of
AN for baseline scheme 2. Besides, we can observe from Figure
3 that the geometry of the network (i.e., the values of rBe and
rRe) has a significant impact on the system sum secrecy rate.
This indicates that the location of the IRS needs to be chosen
carefully for achieving the best possible system performance.
Figure 4 shows the average system sum secrecy rate versus
the number of legitimate users with Pmax = 20 dBm, NT = 6,
and M = 6. We observe that the system sum secrecy rates
achieved by the proposed scheme and the two baseline schemes
monotonically increase with K . This is due to the fact that both
the proposed scheme and the two baseline schemes are able to
exploit multiuser diversity. To investigate the performance gain
attained by deploying IRSs, we show the system sum secrecy
rate of the proposed scheme for two additional cases: Case 1
with NT = 10 and M = 6 and Case 2 with NT = 6 and
M = 10. We observe that Case 2 results in a larger performance
gain over the system with the default parameters (NT = 6 and
M = 6) compared to Case 1. The reasons behind this are two-
fold. On the one hand, the extra phase shifters can reflect more
power of the signal received from the BS which leads to a power
gain. On the other hand, they also provide higher flexibility in
resource allocation which improves the beamforming gain for
the IRS-user links.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an efficient resource allocation
algorithm to achieve secure communication in IRS-assisted mul-
tiuser MISO systems. AN is injected by the BS to enhance phys-
ical layer security. Due to the non-convexity of the formulated
optimization problem, we developed an alternating optimization
algorithm with guaranteed convergence. Our simulation results
reveal that the proposed scheme can significantly enhance
the security of IRS-assisted wireless communication systems
compared to the two baseline schemes, which respectively do
not optimize the IRS phase shift matrix or do not exploit AN.
APPENDIX- PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We note that if Rk − CEk ≤ 0, the proposed algorithm
would stop transmitting information to user k and allocate the
corresponding power to other users. In this case, the optimal
beamforming vector for user k is w∗k = 0 which implies
Rank(W∗k) = 0. Next, for the case where Pmax > 0 and
Rk − CEk > 0, we show that the optimal beamforming matrix
W∗k is indeed a rank-one matrix. To start with, we rewrite (15)
in the following equivalent form:
minimize
Wk,Z∈H
NT ,η,τk,ι
η (25)
s.t. C1,C3,C4, C6: F1 + F2 − G˜1 − G˜2 ≤ η,
C7: τk≥
∑
r∈K
Tr(WrG
H
k uu
HGk)+Tr(ZG
H
k uu
HGk),
C8: ι ≥ Tr(ZLHuuHL),
where F1=−
∑
k∈K
log2(τk + σ
2
nk
) and F2=−
∑
k∈K
log2(ι+ σ
2
ne
),
and τk and ι are auxiliary optimization variables.
Problem (25) is jointly convex with respect to all optimization
variables. Moreover, it can be verified that Slater’s condition
holds [21]. Therefore, strong duality holds, i.e., we can obtain
the optimal solution of (25) by solving the dual problem [21].
The Lagrangian function of (25) in terms of beamforming
matrix Wk is given by
L= ξ
∑
k∈K
Tr(Wk)−
∑
k∈K
Tr(WkYk )
+κTr
([
∇WG1(W
i,Zi) +∇WG2(W
i,Zi)
]T
(W−Wi)
)
−λk
∑
r∈K
Tr(WrG
H
k uu
HGk) + Υ, (26)
where Υ denotes the collection of the optimization variables
of the primal and dual problems and constant terms that are
not relevant to the proof. ξ, κ, and λk denote the scalar
Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints C1, C6, and
C7.Yk ∈ CNT×NT is the Lagrange multiplier matrix associated
with constraint C4. The dual problem of (15) is given by
maximize
Yk0,
ξ,κ,λk≥0
minimize
Wk,Z∈H
NT ,
η,τk,ι
L(Wk,Z, η,Yk, ξ, κ, λk). (27)
Then, we investigate the structure of the optimal W∗k of dual
problem (15) by applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. In particular, the KKT conditions associated with
W∗k are as follows
K1:ξ∗, κ∗, λ∗k ≥ 0,Y
∗
k  0, K2:Y
∗
kW
∗
k = 0, K3:▽W∗kL = 0,
(28)
where ξ∗, κ∗, λ∗k , and Y
∗
k denote the optimal Lagrange multi-
pliers for dual problem (27), and ▽W∗
k
L represents the gradient
vector of (26) with respect to W∗k. To facilitate the proof, we
rewrite K3 explicitly as follows
Y∗k = ξ
∗INT −∆, (29)
where ∆ is given by
∆ = λ∗GHk uu
HGk
−κ∗
(
∇WG1(W
i,Zi) +∇WG2(W
i,Zi)
)
. (30)
Next, by revealing the structure of matrix Y∗k, we prove
that the optimal beamforming matrix W∗ is indeed a rank-one
matrix. To start with, we first denote the maximum eigenvalue
of matrix∆ as νmax
∆
∈ R. We note that the case where multiple
eigenvalues have the same value νmax
∆
occurs with probability
zero, due to the randomness of the channels. Reviewing (29),
if νmax
∆
> ξ∗, then Y∗k cannot be a positive semidefinite matrix
which contradicts K1. On the other hand, if νmax
∆
< ξ∗, then
Y∗k must be a positive definite matrix with full rank. In this
case, considering K2,W∗k is forced to be 0 which is obviously
not the optimal solution for Pmax > 0 and Rk − CEk > 0. In
addition, we note that there exists at least one optimal solution
with ξ∗ > 0 such that constraint C1 is met with equality.
Therefore, for the optimal solution, the equality νmax
∆
= ξ∗ must
hold which results in Rank(Y∗k) = NT− 1. Next, we construct
a bounded optimal solution based on the above discussion. In
particular, we construct a unit-norm vector emax
∆
∈ CNT which
lies in the null space of Y∗k, i.e., Y
∗
ke
max
∆
= 0. We note that
emax
∆
denotes the eigenvector of matrix ∆ corresponding to
the maximum eigenvalue νmax
∆
with unit norm. Therefore, for
Pmax > 0 and Rk − CEk > 0, the optimal beamforming matrix
W∗k is indeed a rank-one matrix which can be expressed as
W∗k = ζe
max
∆
(emax
∆
)H , where ζ is a parameter to adjust W∗k
such that constraint C1 is satisfied with equality. 
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